The transformational object

We know that because of the considerable prematurity of human birth the infant depends on the mother for survival. By serving as a supplementary ego (Heimann, 1956) or a facilitating environment (Winnicott, 1963) she both sustains the baby's life and transmits to the infant, through her own particular idiom of mothering, an aesthetic of being that becomes a feature of the infant's self. The mother's way of holding the infant, of responding to his gestures, of selecting objects, and of perceiving the infant's internal needs, constitutes her contribution to the infant-mother culture. In a private discourse that can only be developed by mother and child, the language of this relation is the idiom of gesture, gaze and intersubjective utterance.

In his work on the mother-child relation, Winnicott stresses what we might call its stillness: the mother provides a continuity of being, she 'holds' the infant in an environment of her making that facilitates his growth. And yet, against this reciprocally enhancing stillness, mother and child continuously negotiate intersubjective experience that coheres around the rituals of psychosomatic need: feeding, diapering, soothing, playing and sleeping. It is undeniable, I think, that as the infant's 'other' self, the mother transforms the baby's internal and external environment. Edith Jacobson suggests that

when a mother turns the infant on his belly, takes him out of his crib, diapers him, sits him up in her arms and on her lap, rocks him, strokes him, kisses him, feeds him, smiles at him, talks and sings to him, she offers him not only all kinds of libidinal gratifications but simultaneously stimulates and prepares the child's sitting, standing, crawling, walking, talking, and on and on, i.e., the development of functional ego activity. (1965, p. 37)
Winnicott (1963b) terms this comprehensive mother the 'environment' mother because, for the infant, she is the total environment. To this I would add that the mother is less significant and identifiable as an object than as a process that is identified with cumulative internal and external transformations. I wish to identify the infant's first subjective experience of the object as a transformational object, and this chapter will address the trace in adult life of this early relationship. A transformational object is experientially identified by the infant with processes that alter self experience. It is an identification that emerges from symbiotic relating, where the first object is 'known' not so much by putting it into an object representation, but as a recurrent experience of being — a more existential as opposed to representational knowing. As the mother helps to integrate the infant's being (instinctual, cognitive, affective, environmental), the rhythms of this process — from unintegration(s) to integration(s) — inform the nature of this 'object' relation rather than the qualities of the object as object.

Not yet fully identified as an other, the mother is experienced as a process of transformation, and this feature of early existence lives on in certain forms of object-seeking in adult life, when the object is sought for its function as a signifier of transformation. Thus, in adult life, the quest is not to possess the object; rather the object is pursued in order to surrender to it as a medium that alters the self, where the subject-as-suppliant now feels himself to be the recipient of enviro-somatic caring, identified with metamorphoses of the self. Since it is an identification that begins before the mother is mentally represented as an other, it is an object relation that emerges not from desire, but from a perceptual identification of the object with its function: the object as enviro-somatic transformer of the subject. The memory of this early object relation manifests itself in the person's search for an object (a person, place, event, ideology) that promises to transform the self.

This conception of the mother being experienced as transformation is supported in several respects. In the first place, she assumes the function of the transformational object, for she constantly alters the infant's environment to meet his needs. There is no delusion operating in the infant's identification of the mother with transformation of being through his symbiotic knowing; it is a fact, for she actually transforms his world. In the second place, the infant's own emergent ego capacities — of motility, perception, and integration — also transform his world. The acquisition of language is perhaps the most significant transformation, but learning to handle and to differentiate between objects, and to remember objects that are not present, are transformative achievements as they result in ego change which alters the nature of the infant's internal world. It is not surprising that the infant identifies these ego achievements with the presence of an object, as the failure of the mother to maintain provision of the facilitating environment, through prolonged absence or bad handling, can evoke ego collapse and precipitate psychic pain.

With the infant's creation of the transitional object, the transformational process is displaced from the mother-environment (where it originated) into countless subjective-objects, so that the transitional phase is heir to the transformational period, as the infant evolves from experience of the process to articulation of the experience. With the transitional object, the infant can play with the illusion of his own omnipotence (lessening the loss of the environment-mother with generative and phasic delusions of self-and-other creation); he can entertain the idea of the object being got rid of, yet surviving his ruthlessness; and he can find in this transitional experience the freedom of metaphor. What was an actual process can be displaced into symbolic equations which, if supported by the mother, mitigate the loss of the original environment-mother. In a sense, the use of a transitional object is the infant's first creative act, an event that does not merely display an ego capacity — such as grasping — but which indicates the infant's subjective experience of such capacities.

THE SEARCH FOR THE TRANSFORMATIONAL OBJECT IN ADULT LIFE
I think we have failed to take notice of the phenomenon in adult life of the wide-ranging collective search for an object that is
identified with the metamorphosis of the self. In many religious faiths, for example, when the subject believes in the deity’s actual potential to transform the total environment, he sustains the terms of the earliest object tie within a mythic structure. Such knowledge remains symbiotic (that is, it reflects the wisdom of faith) and coexists alongside other forms of knowing. In secular worlds, we see how hope invested in various objects (a new job, a move to another country, a vacation, a change of relationship) may both represent a request for a transformational experience and, at the same time, continue the ‘relationship’ to an object that signifies the experience of transformation. We know that the advertising world makes its living on the trace of this object: the advertised product usually promises to alter the subject’s external environment and hence change internal mood.

The search for such an experience may generate hope, even a sense of confidence and vision, but although it seems to be grounded in the future tense, in finding something in the future to transform the present, it is object-seeking that recurrently enacts a pre-verbal ego memory. It is usually on the occasion of the aesthetic moment, which I describe in the next chapter, that an individual feels a deep subjective rapport with an object (a painting, a poem, an aria or symphony, or a natural landscape) and experiences an uncanny fusion with the object, an event that re-echoes an ego state that prevailed during early psychic life. However, such occasions, meaningful as they might be, are less noteworthy as transformational accomplishments than they are for their uncanny quality, the sense of being reminded of something never consciously apprehended but existentially known, the memory of the ontogenetic process rather than thought or fantasies that occur once the self is established. Such aesthetic moments do not sponsor memories of a specific event or relationship, but evoke a psychosomatic sense of fusion that is the subject’s recollection of the transformational object. This anticipation of being transformed by an object — itself an ego memory of the ontogenetic process — inspires the subject with a reverential attitude towards it, so that even though the transformation of the self will not take place on the scale it reached during early life, the adult subject tends to nominate such objects as sacred.

Although my emphasis here is on the positive aesthetic experience, it is well to remember that a person may seek a negative aesthetic experience, for such an occasion ‘prints’ his early ego experiences and registers the structure of the unthought known. Some borderline patients, for example, repeat traumatic situations because through the latter they remember their origins existentially.

In adult life, therefore, to seek the transformational object is to recollect an early object experience, to remember not cognitively but existentially — through intense affective experience — a relationship which was identified with cumulative transformational experiences of the self. Its intensity as an object relation is not due to the fact that this is an object of desire, but to the object being identified with such powerful metamorphoses of being. In the aesthetic moment the subject briefly re-experiences, through ego fusion with the aesthetic object, a sense of the subjective attitude towards the transformational object, although such experiences are re-enacted memories, not recreations.

The search for symbolic equivalents to the transformational object, and the experience with which it is identified, continues in adult life. We develop faith in a deity whose absence, ironically, is held to be as important a test of man’s being as his presence. We go to the theatre, to the museum, to the landscapes of our choice, to search for aesthetic experiences. We may imagine the self as the transformational facilitator, and we may invest ourselves with capacities to alter the environment that are not only impossible but embarrassing on reflection. In such daydreams the self as transformational object lies somewhere in the future tense, and even ruminative planning about the future (what to do, where to go, etc.) is often a kind of psychic prayer for the arrival of the transformational object: a secular second coming of an object relation experienced in the earliest period of life.

It should not be surprising that varied psychopathologies emerge from the failure, as Winnicott put it, to be disillusioned from this relationship. The gambler’s game is that transforma-
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tional object which is to metamorphose his entire
18 internal and external world. A criminal seeks the
17 perfect crime to transform the self internally
16 (repairing ego defects and fulfilling id needs) and
15 externally (bringing wealth and happiness).

Some forms of erotomania may be efforts to establish the other as
the transformational object.

The search for the perfect crime or the perfect woman is not
only a quest for an idealized object. It also constitutes some recog-

....

The search, even though it serves to split the bad self experience from
the subject's cognitive knowledge, is nonetheless a semiological
act that signifies the person's search for a particular object rela-
tion that is associated with ego transformation and repair of the
'b'asic fault' (Balint, 1968).

It may also be true that people who become gamblers reflect a
conviction that the mother (that they had as their mother) will
not arrive with supplies. The experience of gambling can be seen
as an aesthetic moment in which the nature of this person's
relation to the mother is represented.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE

One of the most common psychopathologies of the trans-
formational object relation occurs in the schizoid self, the patient
who may have a wealth of ego strengths (intelligence, talent, ac-
complishment, success) but who is personally bereft and sad
without being clinically depressed.

Peter is a twenty-eight-year-old single male whose sad ex-
pressions, dishevelled appearance, and colourless apparel are
only mildly relieved by a sardonic sense of humour which brings
him no relief, and by an intelligence and education which he uses
for the sake of others but never for himself. He was referred by
his general practitioner for depression, but his problem was more
of an inexorable sadness and personal loneliness. Since his
break-up with a girlfriend, he had lived alone in a flat, dispersing
himself during the day into multiple odd jobs. Although his days
were a flurry of arranged activity, he went through them in a style
of agitated passivity, as if he were being aggressively handled by
his own work arrangement. Once home, he would
collapse into the slovenly comfort of his flat,
where he would prop himself before the TV, eat a
scanty meal of packaged food, masturbate and,
above all, ruminate obsessively about the future
and bemoan his current 'bad luck'. Every week, without failure,
he would go home to see his mother. He felt she lived in order to
talk about him and thus he must be seen by her in order to keep
her content.

Reconstruction of the earliest years of his life yielded the fol-
lowing. Peter was born in a working-class home during the war.
While his father was defending the country, the home was occu-
pi·ed by numerous in-laws. Peter was the first child born in the
family and he was lavishly idolized, particularly by his mother
who spoke constantly to her relatives about how Peter would
undo their misery through great deeds. An inveterate dreamer
about golden days to come, mother's true depression showed up
in the lifeless manner in which she cared for Peter, since she in-
vested all her liveliness in him as mythical object rather than
actual infant. Soon after Peter's analysis began it became clear to
me that he knew himself to be primarily inside a myth he shared
with mother; indeed, he knew that she did not actually attend to
the real him, but to him as the object of her dreams. As her my-
thical object, he felt his life to be suspended and, indeed, this was
the way he lived. He seemed to be preserving himself, attending to
somatic needs, waiting for the day when he would fulfil her
dream. But because it was mother's myth he could do nothing,
only wait for something to happen. He seemed to empty himself
compulsively of his true self needs in order to create an empty
internal space to receive mother's dream thoughts. Each visit to
the home was curiously like a mother giving her son a narrative
feeding. Hence he would empty himself of personal desire and
need in order to fulfil mother's desire and he would preserve him-
self in a state of suspension from life, waiting for the myth to cal-
him into a transformed reality.

Because his mother has transmitted to him his crucial func-
tion as her mythic object, Peter does not experience his internal
psychic space as his own. Inner space exists for the other, so that
in reporting inner states of being Peter does so through a depersonalized narrative as this region is not the 'from me' but the 'for her'. There is a notable absence in Peter of any sense of self, no quality of an 'I', nor even of a 'me'. Instead his self representation bears more the nature of an 'it' on an existential plane. Being an 'it' means for him being dormant, suspended, inert. Peter's free associations are accounts of 'it' states: ruminate reports on the happenings of his body as a depersonalized object. His mother's primary concern was for him to remain in good health in order to fulfil her dreams for him. He was consequently obsessed with any somatic problem, which he reported with almost clinical detachment.

Gradually I recognized that the mythic structure (existing in a narrative rather than existential reality) disguised the secret discourse of the lost culture of Peter's earliest relation to his mother. His ego-states were an utterance to mother to use them as the vocabulary of myth. If he was feeling like a casualty because of ego defects and the failure of id needs, it was because he was her knight errant who had fought battles for her and must rest for future missions. If he felt depleted by his personal relations it was because he was a cherished god who could not expect to mix successfully with the masses. If he spoke to his mother with a sigh she responded, not by discovering the source of the sigh, but by telling him not to worry, that soon he would make money, become famous, go on TV, and bring to the family all the wealth that they deserved.

His existential despair was continually flung into mythic narrative, a symbolic order where the real is used to populate the fantastic. On the few occasions when he tried to elicit from his mother some actual attendance to his internal life, she flew into a rage and told him that his misery threatened their lives, as only he could deliver them. He was to remain the golden larva, the unborn hero, who, if he did not shatter mythic function with personal needs, would soon be delivered into a world of riches and fame beyond his imagination.

In the transference Peter spoke of himself as an object in need of care: 'my stomach hurts', 'I have a pain in my neck', 'I have a cold', 'I don't feel well'. He spoke to me in the language of sighs, groans, and a haunting laughter which served his need to be emptied of agitated desire and to elicit my acute attention. He rubbed his hands, looked at his fingers, flopped his body around as if it were a sack. As I came to realize that this was not obsessive rumination which served as a resistance, but a secret discourse recalled from the culture of his earliest relations to his mother, I found my attention to his private language an immense relief. I felt that he was trying to share a secret with me within the transference, but it was a secret utterance that was prior to language and masked by its enigmatic quality. I could only 'enter' this sequestered culture by speaking to him in his language: to be attentive to all groans, sighs, remarks about his body, etc. Above all, I was to learn that what he wanted was to hear my voice, which I gradually understood to be his need for a good sound. My interpretations were appreciated less for their content, and more for their function as structuring experiences. He rarely recalled the content of an interpretation. What he appreciated was the sense of relief brought to him through my voice.

Peter's language, which I shared in the beginning of the analysis, reflected the terms of a minimally transformative mother. Later, when Peter would invite me to become a simple accomplice in the mother's transformational idiom, I would refuse such transformations (such as the golden larva myth) in favour of achievable transformations. As I analysed this transformational idiom, it gave way to a new culture of relatedness. The constellation had to be broken down through analysis before a new idiom of relatedness could be established.

Peter's sense of fate, his remaining a potential transformational object to the other, suggests that not only does the infant require separation and disillusion from the transformational mother, but the mother must also suffer a 'let-down' brought on by the real needs of the infant, which mitigates the mother's unconscious wish for an infant to be her transformational object. Peter's mother continually refused to recognize and attend to him as a real person, though admittedly there was a quality of what we might call covetous mothering. She
possessed him like an alchemist guarding dross that was her potential treasure. His real needs went unmet, as mother insisted that Peter fulfill her sense that destiny would bring her a deliverer-child.

DISCUSSION

The search for the transformational object, in both narcissistic and schizoid characters, is in fact an internal recognition of the need for ego repair and, as such, is a somewhat manic search for health. At the same time their idiom reflects a minimal transformative mother, a factor that becomes clear in the often meager way they use the analyst in the transference. I will discuss the analyst’s confrontation vis-à-vis the transfer of the patient’s transformational idiom in the chapters on countertransference.

To be sure, one of the features of such patients is their comparative unavailability for relating to the actual other – their obtuseness or excessive withdrawnness – but I think such characteristics, reflective of psychodevelopmental arrests, also point towards the patient’s need to assert the region of illness as a plea for the arrival of the regressive object relation that is identified with basic ego repair. In analysis this can result in the patient’s almost total inability to relate to the analyst as a real person, while at the same time maintaining an intense relation to the analyst as a transformational object. What is the patient trying to establish?

As other authors have pointed out (for example, Smith, 1977), such patients seek a special ambience with the analyst, where the analyst’s interpretations are initially less important for their content and more significant for what is experienced as a maternal presence, an empathic response. Indeed, so-called analytic neutrality of expression – ostensibly to mitigate the hysterical or obsessional patient’s dread of feeling criticized and to facilitate the analysand’s freedom of association – actually works in a different way for narcissistic or schizoid patients: they can become enchanted by it, and may appear oblivious to the actual content of the interpretation so long as the song of the analytic voice remains constant. Now, we may look upon this as a compli-
ego transformations with the mother is a perceptual identification — and not a desire — so, too, the patient’s identification does not seem to reflect the patient’s desire for us to be transformational, but his adamant perceptual identification of the analyst as transformational object. In the treatment of the narcissistic, borderline and schizoid characters, this phase of the analysis is both necessary and inevitable.

This stage of treatment is very difficult for the clinician since, in a sense, there is no analysis of the patient taking place, and interpretive remarks may be met by a gamut of refusals: from indifference to polite contempt to rage. One such patient would often nod politely, say that yes he did see what I meant, indeed was impressed with how accurate my remark was, but invariably he would end by saying: ‘But of course, you know what you have said is only technically correct. It doesn’t help me with life experiences, so, as such, as correct as it is I don’t see what you think I can do with such a remark.’ He was convinced I knew how to take care of him, and even if it was only for an hour a day, he wanted me to soothe him. Analysis proper was regarded as an intellectual intrusion into his tranquil experience of me, and I was for him a kind of advanced computer storing his information, processing his needs into my memory banks. He was waiting for an eventual session when I would suddenly emerge with the proper solution for him, and in an instant remedy his life. I have come to regard this part of his analysis as that kind of regression which is a re-enactment of the earliest object experience, and I think it is folly for an analyst to deny that the culture of the analytic space does indeed facilitate such recollections. If such regressions are a resistance to the analysis of the self, they are resistances only in the sense that the patient must resist analytic investigation as premature, and therefore not to the point. In the transference — which is as much to the analytic space and process as it is to the person of the analyst — the patient is relating to the transformational object, that is, experiencing the analyst as the environment-mother, a pre-verbal memory that cannot be cognized into speech that recalls the experience, but only into speech that demands its terms be met: unintrusiveness, ‘holding’, ‘provision’, insistence on a kind of symbiotic or telepathic knowing, and facilitation from thought to thought or from affect to thought. In these sessions, then, the primary form of discourse is a clarification which the patient experiences as a transformative event. Interpretations which require reflective thought or which analyse the self are often felt to be precocious demands on the patient’s psychic capacity, and such people may react with acute rage or express a sudden sense of futility and despair.

Perhaps because psychoanalytic theory evolved from work with the hysterical patient (who interpreted the analytic space as a seduction) or the obsessional patient (who adopted it willingly as another personal ritual) we have tended to regard regressive reactions to the analytic space as resistances to the working alliance or the analytic process. Yet the hysteric’s sexualization of the transference and the obsessional’s ritualization of the analytic process (free dissociation?) may be seen as defences against the very ‘invitation’ of the analytic space and process towards regression. Thus, in the analysis of such patients, psychic material was readily forthcoming and one could be relatively pleased that there was considerable grist for the analytic mill, but treatment often continued endlessly with no apparent character change, or was suddenly intruded upon by archaic or primitive material. In such cases I believe the analyst was unaware that the failure of the patient to experience the analytic situation as a regressive invitation was a resistance. Indeed, the analytic process, in emphasizing the mechanics of free association and interpretation of the patient’s defences, could often result in a denial of the very object relation that was ‘offered’ to the patient. If the analyst cannot acknowledge that in fact he is offering a regressive space to the patient (that is, a space that encourages the patient to relive his infantile life in the transference), if he insists that in the face of the invitation ‘work’ must be carried out, it is not surprising that in such analyses patient and analyst may either carry on in a kind of mutual dissociation that leads nowhere (obsessional collusion), or in a sudden blow-up on the part of the patient, often termed ‘acting out’.
As I view it, then, the analyst functions as an evocative mnemonic trace of the transformational object, because the situation will either induce a patient's regressive recollection of this early object relation or the variations of resistance to it: either denial by sexualization or obsessional ritualization, for example. Indeed, the transference from this point of view is first and foremost a transference reaction to this primary object relation and will help us to see how the patient remembers his own experience of it. There may be a deep regression to an adamant demand that the analyst fulfill the promise of the invitation and function in a magically transformative manner. Or the patient may have enough health and insight into regressive recollections to carry on with subsequent work in the analysis while remaining in touch with more archaic aspects of the self. Indeed I believe that much of the time a patient's passivity, wordlessness or expectation that the analyst knows what to do is not a resistance to any particular conscious or preconscious thought, but a recollection of the early pre-verbal world of the infant being with mother. Unless we recognize that psychoanalysts share in the construction of this pre-verbal world through the analyst's silence, empathic thought and the total absence of didactic instruction, we are being unfair to the patient and he may have reason to be perplexed and irritated.

The search for transformation and for the transformational object is perhaps the most pervasive archaic object relation, and I want to emphasize that this search arises not out of desire for the object per se, or primarily out of craving or longing. It arises from the person's certainty that the object will deliver transformation; this certainty is based on the object's nominated capacity to resuscitate the memory of early ego transformation. In arguing this, I am maintaining that though no cognitive memory of the infant's experience of the mother is available, the search for the transformational object, and nomination of the deliverer of environmental transformation, is an ego memory.

In a curious way, it is solely the ego's object and may, indeed, be to the utter shock or indifference of the person's subjective experience of his own desire. A gambler is compelled to gamble. Subjectively, he may wish he did not gamble, even hate his compulsion to do so. In Melville's *Moby Dick*, Ahab feels compelled to seek the whale, even though he feels alienated from the source of his own internal compulsion. He says:

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What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it; what cozening, hidden lord and master, and cruel, remorseless emperor commands me; then against all natural lovings and longings, I so keep pushing, and crowding, and jamming myself on all the time; recklessly making me ready to do what in my own proper, natural heart, I durst not so much as dare? Is Ahab, Ahab? Is it I, God, or who, that lifts this arm? (1851, pp. 444-5)
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There is something impersonal and ruthless about the search for the whale, and indeed for all objects nominated as transformational. Once early ego memories are identified with an object that is contemporary, the subject's relation to the object can become fanatical, and I think many extremist political movements indicate a collective certainty that their revolutionary ideology will effect a total environmental transformation that will deliver everyone from the gamut of basic faults: personal, familial, economic, social and moral. Again, it is not the
revolutionary's desire for change, or the extremist's longing for change, but his certainty that the object (in this case the revolutionary ideology) will bring about change that is striking to the observer.

CONCLUSIONS

In work with certain kinds of patients (schizoid and narcissistic) who exaggerate a particular object-seeking, and in our analysis of certain features of culture, I think we can isolate the trace in the adult of the earliest experience of the object: the experience of an object that transforms the subject's internal and external world. I have called this first object the transformational object, since I want to identify it with the object as process, thus linking the first object with the infant's experience of it. Before the mother is personalized for the infant as a whole object, she has functioned as a region or source of transformation, and since the infant's own nascent subjectivity is almost completely the experience of the ego's integrations (cognitive, libidinal, affective), the first object is identified with the alterations of the ego's state. With the infant's growth and increasing self-reliance, the relation to the mother changes from the mother as the other who alters the self to a person who has her own life and her own needs. As Winnicott says, the mother disillusioned the infant from the experience of mother as the sole preserver of his world, a process that occurs as the infant is increasingly able to meet his own needs and requirements. The ego experience of being transformed by the other remains as a memory that may be re-enacted in aesthetic experiences, in a wide range of culturally-dreamed-of transformational objects (such as new cars, homes, jobs and vacations) that promise total change of internal and external environment, or in the varied psychopathological manifestations of this memory, for example in the gambler's relation to his object or in the extremist's relation to his ideological object.

In the aesthetic moment, when a person engages in deep subjective rapport with an object, the culture embodies in the arts varied symbolic equivalents to the search for transformation. In the quest for a deep subjective experience of an object, the artist both remembers for us and provides us with occasions for the experience of ego memories of transformation. In a way, the experience of the aesthetic moment is neither social nor moral; it is curiously impersonal and even ruthless, as the object is sought out only as deliverer of an experience.

As I shall maintain in the next chapter, the aesthetic space allows for a creative enactment of the search for this transformational object relation, and we might say that certain cultural objects afford memories of ego experiences that are now profoundly radical moments. Society cannot possibly meet the requirements of the subject, as the mother met the needs of the infant, but in the arts we have a location for such occasional recollections: intense memories of the process of self-transformation.

Although all analysands will experience the analytic space as an invitation to regress in the care of a transformational object, and although it may be essential for the analyst to allow the patient a prolonged experience of regression to dependence (see below, chapter 14), many patients, as I will take up in the final part of this book, will invite the analyst into a pathological transformational relation. For example, some analysands create confusion in order to compel the analyst to misunderstand them. This is a negative transformation and may represent the transfer of a pathological mother-child relation. Of course this must eventually be analysed, but even here, in the analyst's vigorous interpretive work I think the patient unconsciously experiences the analyst as a generative transformational object.

Transformation does not mean gratification. Growth is only partially promoted by gratification, and one of the mother's transformative functions must be to frustrate the infant. Likewise, aesthetic moments are not always beautiful or wonderful occasions -- many are ugly and terrifying but nonetheless profoundly moving because of the existential memory tapped.
The Shadow of the Object

Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known

CHRISTOPHER BOLLAS

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